The State of Utah v. Leo Barrett Stewart, Jr. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1960
The State of Utah v. Leo Barrett Stewart, Jr. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Leland S. McCullough; Attorney for Defendant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Stewart, No. 9331 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3789
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UfAlt L E D 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plnintiff arul Respondent, 
vs. 
LEO BARRETT STEWART, JR., 
Defendant and Appellant, 
_:_G 2 - ~J6{) 
Case No. 9331 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH 
Attorney for Defendant 
304 East 1st South 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------- 1-26 
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------- 27 
ARGUMENT ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 27 
POINT I. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
ALLOW THE CITY ENGINEER, JAMES CHAL-
LIS, TO TESTIFY WITH RESPECT TO THE 
STUDIES AND INVESTIGATIONS AT THE 
PARTICULAR INTERSECTION IN QUESTION 
TO SHOW THE DEFECTIVE CONDITION OF 
THE SEMAPHORE. ---------------------------------------------- 27-33 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN THE ADMIS-
SION OF EVIDENCE. -------------------------------------------- 34-36 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------- 36 
CASES CITED 
Parker v. Bamberger, et al, 100 U 361, 116 P 2d 425 ____ 29-30 
Remy v. Olds, 4 Cal, unreported, 240, 34 P 21'6, 21 
LRA 645 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 33 
Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 U 320, 159 P 530 __________ 31-32 
Sinclair v. U. S., 265 F. 991, 49 App. D. C. 351 ____________ 28 
Stocker v. Ogden City, McFarland v. Ogden City, 88 U 
389, 54 p 2d 849 -------------------------------------------------------- 30-31 
TEXTS 
20 Am J ur - Evidence - par. 304, page 282 ____________ 32 
20 Am Jur- Evidence- par. 247, page 240 ____________ 32 
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 1, 3d Ed. par. 9 I ---------------- 33 
20 Am Jur - Evidence- par. 251, page 245 ____________ 36 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LEO BARRETT STEWART, JR., 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 9331 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACT 
The above entitled case came on for hearing on 
the 7th day of June, 1960, before the Honorable 
A. H. Ellett, Judge of the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Defendant 
was charged in the information of the crime of neg-
ligent homicide in violation of Title 41, Chapter 6, 
Section 43.10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as en-
acted by the laws of Utah in 1955, and as amended 
by the laws of Utah in 1957, as follows, to wit: 
"That the said Leo Barrett Stewart, Jr. on or about 
the 9th day of March, 1959, in the County of Salt 
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Lake, State of Utah, being then and there a person 
operating a vehicle, to-wit, a 1956 GMC pickup 
truck, did then and there unlawfully and negligently 
drive said vehicle with reckless disregard for the 
safety of others, and did then and there inflict in-
jury by the driving of said vehicle upon a person, 
to-wit, Paul Weddington, thereby proximately caus-
ing his death, which death ensued within one year 
of said injury." (R. 8) The jury found defendant 
guilty as charged on June 7, 1960, and notice of 
appeal was filed on June 24, 1960. 
Officer Norris K. Johnson of the Salt Lake City 
Police Department was called and testified for the 
State as follows: That he was one of the investigat-
ing officers; that on the 9th day of March, 1959, 
he was called to the scene of an accident at 21st 
South and 9th East Street, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
that he arrived at the scene of the accident at ap-
proximately 7 :57 A.M. On his arrival he found a 
pickup truck and a passenger car had collided; that 
they were in approximately the position as shown 
on Exhibit P-1 and Exhibit P-7. The deceased, Paul 
Weddington, was the driver of the Plymouth auto-
mobile; defendant, Leo Barrett Stewart, Jr., was 
the driver of the truck. At the time of the accident 
Mr. Weddington was alone in the passenger car and 
defendant Stewart was the sole occupant of the 
pickup truck. The measurements as set forth on said 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
two Exhibits were made by Officer Norris K. John-
son. 
Officer Johnson testified that he could find 
no skid marks from either vehicle ( R. 36) . Officer 
Johnson also identified the Exhibits P-2, 3, 4, 5 and 
6, showing the vehicles involved in the accident, and 
also P-3 showing the intersection at 9th East and 
21st South Street looking to the west, and Exhibit 
P-2, the same intersection, looking to the south. 
The photographs, Officers Johnson admitted, were 
taken four days after the accident and were intro-
duced merely to show the general nature of the in-
tersection itself ( R. 38) . Officer Johnson testified 
that the single semaphore at said intersection was 
working at the time he arrived at the scene of the 
accident. Officer Johnson testified that he found 
a Mr. Taylor, a witness to the accident; that in the 
presence of Officer Johnson and Mr. Taylor and 
defendant Stewart, Mr. Taylor stated that Mr. Stew-
art had run the red light; further, Officer Johnson 
testified that Mr. Stewart did not reply or say any-
thing to said remark made by Mr. Taylor (R. 39). 
Officer Johnson also read the statement that Mr. 
Stewart gave to him at the time of the accident. 
"Mr. Stewart states, I was going west on 21st 
South. The last time I had looked at the light it was 
green; that was about 150 feet approximately before 
the intersection. I never even saw the other car 
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until I was in the intersection and then it was too 
late. I was in the middle lane at the time." (R. 40). 
He further stated that defendant Stewart told him 
that defendant Stewart was traveling at approxi-
mately 30 m.p.h. at the time of the accident (R. 40). 
That the distance of danger when Stewart realized 
there was going to be an accident was approximately 
10 feet ( R. 40). The light sequence for the sema-
phore for the lights facing to the east on 21st South 
was determined by Officer Johnson to be as follows: 
a five-second yellow light thirty-second red light 
and a thirty-five second green light (R. 41). Officer 
Johnson also testified that at the time of the acci-
dent, approximately 7 :4'5 A.M., the sun was just 
above the mountains and shining westerly down 
21st South (R. 41-42). Officer Johnson also testi-
fied that he had made investigation of other acci-
dents at this intersection and that in his report in 
the investigation of this particular accident of Mr. 
Stewart's, he listed as one of the possible factors 
in this accident the sun obscuring the light in the 
semaphore ( R. 42) . 
"Q. Isn't it a fact that in your report 
in your investigation of this accident you 
listed as one of the possible factors in this 
accident the sun obscuring the light sema-
phore? 
"A. I stated that the sun was shining 
directly on the semaphore, it possibly might 
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have had an effect on the vision of the driver." 
(R. 42). 
On cross-examination ( R. 43) Officer Johnson 
was asked the following question: 
"Q. Did you ever have any other con-
versations with Mr. Stewart when Mr. Taylor 
was present other than the one you just told 
us about? 
"A. Not that I can remember. 
"Q. Do you remember Mr. Stewart in 
that conversation and in the presence of Mr. 
T·aylor making a statement to this effect: 
'That man ran the red light directly in front 
of me, or something to that effect?' 
Objection to the question was made by the State 
and the court refused to allow the Officer to answer 
the question (R. 43-44). Further at R. 44 counsel 
for defendant on cross-examination, asked Officer 
Johnson: 
"Q. One other question, Officer John-
son, this intersection - or Officer Johnson 
- excuse me - this intersection at 9th East 
and 21st South is one of the most dangerous 
intersections in the city, is it not?" 
The court refused to allow Officer Johnson to 
answer that question (R. 44). Officer Johnson did 
testify that he had attended or investigated several 
accidents at this particular intersection (R. 44-45). 
Further he testified that there had been many acci-
dents at this particular intersection (R. 45). 
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With reference to the position of the victim, 
Paul Weddington, as shown on Exhibits P-7 and 
P-1, there was uncertainty as to whether or not the 
position of the victim as shown on said exhibits was 
the actual position where the victim was after the 
accident. Police Officer Colbert of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department testified that it was cus-
tomary prior to removing a victim, such as Mr. 
Weddington, to make a chalk mark around the body 
indicating the location where he was at the time. 
However, in this particular case that was not done. 
Mr. Earl B. Taylor was called to testify on 
behalf of the State. Mr. Taylor testified (R. 52, 
53) : That on the morning of March 9, 1959, at 
approximately 7:45 A.M. he was traveling south 
on 9th East to his place of employment; that as he 
approached the intersection of 9th East and 21st 
South the light changed red before he reached it; 
that there was another car stopped ahead of him 
(R. 53). The car in front of him was the Wedding-
ton Plymouth automobile. He stated that they waited 
for a few moments and the light changed green and 
that immediately on the change of the light to green 
the Plymouth automobile in front of him started 
through the intersection ( R. 54). Mr. Taylor testi-
fied that he had pulled forward a little ahead of 
where he had stopped and glanced to the east and 
saw this truck coming through the intersection. 
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That he stepped on his brakes and stopped his auto-
mobile in the cross-walk. That the truck came in 
through the intersection and struck the Plymouth 
automobile towards the middle section of the car 
(R. 54). At the time Mr. Taylor first saw the pick-
up truck it was approximately two car lengths back 
of the intersection; that there were two cars in the 
left-turn lane going south or going west on 21st 
South (R. 54). Further, that the driver of the pick-
up truck did not put on his brakes until just as he 
hit the Plymouth automobile (R. 55). Mr. Taylor 
testifed that Mr. Stewart after the accident walked 
up towards him and stated: "I have often heard of 
these kind of things, but this is the first time I have 
been in one. That man ran right out in front of 
me." Mr. Taylor testified that he CMr. Taylor) 
replied, "You were wrong, because you came through 
that red light." The defendant Stewart made no re-
mark to that. 
On cross-examination Mr. Taylor stated that 
the Weddington Plymouth car came to a complete 
stop at the intersection of 9th East and 21st Soutn 
and that just the instant the light turned to green 
the Weddington Plymouth automobile started up 
fairly quick (R. 56). Mr. Taylor on cross-examina-
tion further testified that after his car had moved 
forward just a matter of a few feet he had no diffi-
culty in seeing the pickup truck coming from the 
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left; that it didn't look like the pickup truck could 
make a good stop if he did stop · ( R. 57) and for 
that reason Mr. Taylor stopped his automobile. Mr. 
Taylor further testified that the light that would 
be facing the traffic coming from the east could not 
be seen directly by him but that he could see when 
the yellow light came on (R. 59). 
It was stipulated and agreed in open court be-
tween the State and counsel for Defendant without 
the necessity of having the attending physician tes-
tify, that Paul Edward Weddington, the victim, died 
as a result of the accident; that the date of his 
death was March 12, 1959. 
Joanne Monroe testified for the State as fol-
lows: That on the morning of March 9, 1959, at 
approximately 7 :45 A.M. she was on her way to 
work at the Franklin School; she was proceeding 
west on 21st South (R. 63) that she approached 
the intersection of 21st South and 9th East; that 
she proceeded to the righthand lane behind another 
car preparatory to making a right hand turn from 
2.1st South onto 9th East going north (R. 63). She 
testified that the car in front of her and she had 
come to a complete stop for the red light when she 
noticed another car coming down the lane to her left 
that wasn't stopping for the red light (R. 63). She 
testified that she had been stopped for approximately 
3 or 4 seconds; that the other car approaching on 
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her left did not seem to be slowing down to stop for 
the red light (R. 63). That the car on her left, the 
pickup truck, proceeded into the intersection and 
hit the Weddington Plymouth automobile; that the 
Plymouth automobile was struck midsection by the 
pickup truck ( R. 64). Mrs. Monroe testified that 
she had been driving for approximately 9 years and 
she estimated the speed of the pickup truck as 40 
m.p.h. (R. 64) and that she did not notice any 
slowing down or change of speed as the pickup 
truck approached the intersection ( R. 64). She fur-
ther testified: "I didn't notice that I had any dif-
ficulty in seeing the light" ( R. 64). 
On cross-examination she stated: 
"Q. Mrs. Monroe, were you the first 
car to stop at this int~rsection, or were you 
the second. 
''A. There was a car in front of me. 
I was the second one. 
"Q. I see, so whether or not you no-
ticed the light you would have stopped any-
way because of the car in front of you, 
wouldn't you? 
''A. I am sure that's true, yes. 
"Q. Do you think you were particularly 
paying attention to the semaphore at that 
time. 
"A. I am quite certain I noticed it or 
I wouldn't have thought he is going to run 
the red light, which was my first thought. 
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Mrs. Monroe on cross-examination testified 
that she first noticed the pickup truck when it was 
right along side her and followed it until it reached 
the intersection (R. 65). That according to the 
measurements she actually saw the pickup truck 
for a distance of approximately 46 feet is it passed 
her on the left ( R. 66) . Even though she only saw 
the pickup for that distance, she still felt she was 
able to determine the speed of the automobile. The 
posted speed limit on 21st South going east and west 
was established in court as 30 m.p.h. ( R. 66) . Mrs. 
Monroe further testified that she did not know 
who the driver was of the car in front of her; that 
he must have made a right turn proceeding north 
on 9th East Street (R. 67). 
Mr. Douglas Hubbard, witness for the State, 
testified that on the 9th of March, 1959, he was 
proceeding north on 9th East Street at approxi-
mately 7:45 A.M. on his way to work. That his 
wife accompanied him in the front seat of their 
car (R. 68). That he was in the lane of traffic near-
est the center line ( R. 69) . Just before he arrived 
at the intersection the light turned yellow; he slowed 
down and came to a stop and waited until the light 
changed to red, that is, he waited through a yellow 
light and a red light (R. 69). That after the light 
turned green, he stated: 
''Q. All right, now what happened after 
the light turned green? 
10 
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A. After the light turned green - I 
am in the habit of looking at traffic, I don't 
trust the light, and as I looked to my right 
I saw this pickup truck and he seemed to be 
coming along at a fairly good speed and I 
didn't think he was going to stop, and I had 
crossed the lane about 3 feet approximately 
so I stopped and the truck went in front of 
me." 
That the truck struck the gray Plymouth ap-
proximately in the midsection of the Plymouth. He 
testified that he first saw the truck when it was 
a few feet beyond the corner of Petty's Ford show-
room, that is a little bit to the east of the west 
corner (R. 70). Mr. Hubbard testified that the 
truck was traveling close to 25 m.p.h. and as he 
approached the cross lane he stepped on it, the 
truck speeded up and at the point of impact was 
traveling in his opinion approximately 30 m.p.h., 
that is he had increased his speed 5 m.p.h. That he 
determined this from the sound of the motor and 
the actual movement of the vehicle (R. 70-71). That 
his vehicle was in the intersection no more than 3 
feet at the time of the accident. On cross-examina-
tion Mr. Hubbard testified that he had used this 
route on his way to work on prior occasions, and 
that on prior occasions he had seen other cars run 
the red light both at 9th East and 7th. At that point 
.the State raised an objection and the court refused 
to allow the witness to testify with respect to any 
11 
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further violations of the semaphores (R. 72). Mr. 
Hubbard testified on cross-examination (R. 73) 
that it was apparent the pickup truck was going to 
proceed through the intersection and this was ap-
parent to him when the truck was approximately 
6 to 8 feet east of the east crosswalk. Mr. Hubbard 
also testified with respect to the Weddington car, 
(R. 7'3-76) : 
"Q. Now, had he come to a cor.aplete 
stop at that intersection before he started 
(he is referring to the Weddington car). 
"A. Yes, I happened to be watching as 
he came to the intersection, and the light was 
red for him and he slowed down more or less 
getting ready to put on his brakes, and he had 
stopped. 
"Q. But you think he did stop. 
''A. Oh, yes. 
"Q. Do you remember having your 
deposition taken here several months ago, and 
didn't you in that deposition state that in 
your opinion the Weddington car or this gray 
Plymouth did not come to a complete stop? 
"A. I don't remember for sure. That 
was over a year ago. 
"Q. Well, your recollection a year ago 
would have been better than it is at the pre-
sent time, wouldn't it, with respect to this 
accident? 
"A. Oh, when I gave my deposition I 
was positive of every fact I stated, yes. ' 
1'2 
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"Q. I see. Did you have occasion to ob-
serve the driver of this gray Plymouth, par-
ticularly whether he looked to the right or the 
left in starting out into the intersection? 
"A. Not to be sure, no. 
"Q. Let me call your attention to the 
25th day of September, 1959, at three fifty 
o'clock p.m. You had your deposition taken, 
did you not, before L. Reid Seely, a notary 
public, up in the Executive Buirding? Do you 
remember that? 
"A. In the Insurance Building? 
"Q. Well, maybe it was the Insurance 
Building. I thought it was the Executive 
Building. 
"A. Could be. 
"Q. Do you remember having your de-
position taken at that time? 
A. (Witness nods.) 
"Q. Do you remember this question and 
the answer that you gave to it: Question, 
Now, where was Mr. Weddington's car when 
you first observed it? 
Answer, 'I glanced at him. I saw him 
coming toward me slowly, on the other side 
of the street. He was just crawling. I think 
he saw the light was going to turn green, 
probably, and he just crept along to save put-
ting on his brakes. I believe he did put them 
on before he hit there, but the light turned 
green before he came anywhere near the 
crosswalk.' 
Question, 'What is your opinion as to 
13 
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how far north of the north crosswalk Mr. 
Weddington's car was when the light changed 
green, facing you?' 
Answer, 'Oh, making a rough stab, I'd 
say about fifteen or twenty feet.' 
Question, 'And how fast was Mr. Wed-
dington going at that time, in your opinion? 
Answer, 'In my opinion, he'd be close to 
a stall. He'd be going about ten to fifteen, 
ten to twelve miles an hour.' " 
* * * * 
"Q. Calling your attention to one other 
matter, Mr. Hubbard, with respect to your 
deposition taken on the above date, and as 
purely a matter to refresh your recollection 
with reference to this question I asked you 
about observing Mr. Weddington and whether 
or not he looked to the right or to the left, 
let me ask you if at that time in your deposi-
tion these were the questions and answers that 
were given at that time: Question, 'Did you 
observe which way he was looking before the 
accident happened? Did you observe Mr. Wed-
dington at all in his car?' 
Answer, 'Just looking straight ahead. I 
saw him just looking like that (indicating). 
He was driving.' 
"Do you remember that question and 
your answer to it? 
"A. I don't remember it now, but it 
must have been correct at that time." 
Further, on cross-examination at R. 7 6 the 
following question was asked: 
14 
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"Q. Now, also, Mr. Hubbard, isn't it 
a fact that you were particularly cautious of 
this intersection because other cars prior to 
this time had been running the red light in 
front of you at this intersection? 
A. No. 
"Q. Let me call your attention to one 
other factor in your deposition and see if this 
doesn't refresh your recollection to -
"MR. BLACK: Just a minute. I have 
already objected once to any evidence of prior 
incidents of other cars at this intersection. I 
believe it is immaterial. 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Your Honor, I 
didn't bring it out for that purpose, and I 
made it specifically clear that I didn't. 
"THE COUR'T: I think you have no 
right to refresh his recollection unless he tes-
tifies now to something contrary to the way 
he testified before. 
''MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, he did. That 
is what I am trying to bring out, Your Honor. 
I asked what was the reason for his being 
particularly cautious of this intersection. He 
says, 'Well, just I don't want somebody to 
hit me,' or something of that nature. The thing 
I want to bring out is something entirely 
contrary to that. 
"THE COURT: May I see what you 
are about to read to him? 
(Judge looks at deposition.) 
"THE COURT: The objection is sus-
tained. 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: May the record 
15 
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show we would like to make a proffer of proof 
on that?" 
The proffer of proof made out of the presence 
of the jury is found at page 80 of the Record, to-wit: 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Comes now the 
defendant and excepts to the ruling of the 
court with respect to the exclusion of the 
testimony solicited of the witness Douglas 
Hubbard in response to the question as to-
what did he say? 
"THE COURT: I know what he was 
going to say. He was going to say people had 
been running that red light in front of him 
for a long time, and that's why he was soli-
citous of his own welfare. 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, in re-
sponse to the question of the counsel for the 
defendant to the effect that - or as to why 
he was particularly cautious at this inter-
section, defendant offers the following prof-
fer of proof, and the witness would have testi-
fied as follows: 'I wasn't too much interested 
in him' - referring to the defendant- 'until 
the light turned red. Then I wondered who 
was going to run it this morning. That's the 
first thing I thought. I thought, 'Who's going 
to run the red light this morning?' 
"And further, 'Well, the light turned 
green, and I got ready to move. And, of course, 
as I moved, just as I started, I looked. I 
thought, 'Well, who's coming?' And I saw 
this truck coming, and I mentioned to my 
wife, I said, 'Well, here goes another one. He 
can have the right-of-way as far as I'm con-
cerned.' 
16 
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"That's all. 
"THE COURT: That is the proffer 
that you tender, and do you want to hear it, 
or do you have objections? 
"MR. BLACK: What is that? 
"THE COURT: I say that is his prof-
fer. Do you want the jury to hear it, or do 
you have objections to it? 
"MR. BLACK: I object to it for the 
same reason as stated before, that I think it 
is immaterial. 
"THE COURT: The objection is sus-
tained. And you have a motion you want to 
make.'' 
At the close of the State's case defendant made 
a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the State 
'failed to prove the commission of a crime and the 
motion of the defendant was denied. Whereupon, 
counsel for defendant made his opening statement. 
At this point the court instructed the reporter not 
to take down the opening statement made by Mr. 
·McCullough. That opening statement becomes very 
material at this point because of the effect of the 
court's ruling in refusing to allow Mr. James Challis, 
the City Traffic Engineer, to testify in behalf of 
the defendant. At pages (R. 81-83) court stated: 
"THE COURT: I'm not sure I am 
going to let Mr. Challis testify to that effect, 
Mr. McCullough, because I have ruled hereto-
fore that that is immaterial. Whether a lot 
17 
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of other people have been negligent or ~heth~r 
a lot of other people have run stop signs IS 
no concern of ours. Whether this defendant 
was negligent is a concern of ours; if he is 
negligent, whether it is of such a grave. nat~re 
as to constitute recklessness so as to bring him 
within this charge; and I don't believe that 
this jury or I would be interested in knowing 
that on other occasions other people have done 
the same thin'g. I think I would not take our 
time on that. 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, I think 
the testimony that he can give with reference 
to this intersection and subsequent changes 
that have taken place are material and go to 
the very issue that we are trying to decide, 
this question of recklessness. 
"THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to 
let him tell about how many people have vio-
lated the law or whether or not they have 
violated the law. I don't think that helps us 
a hit. If there is anything peculiar about this 
intersection or its timing that would help the 
jury in determining whether this defendant 
viola ted the law, then, of course, it would be 
material; but just for us to get out and try 
to determine whether other people were violat-
ing the law or not won't help us here. It seems 
to me it is something like when a man is 
charged with negligently shooting a deer hunt-
er, and he could show every year so many deer 
hunters get shot every year. We are not in-
terested in that case. We are interested in 
what happened in this case, and I will limit 
you to this case. 
''MR. McCULLOU'GH: Of course I 
don't want to dispute the matter with Y~ur 
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Honor since you have the last word anyway. 
"THE COURT: Well, I do temporarily. 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: But if you are 
going to limit it to that extent, the only issue 
is if the light was red, the light was red when 
he ran it, then he is guilty period. 
"THE COURT: No, that is not quite. 
My instructions will show that is not true. 
There has got to be an element of recklessness 
in here before this defendant is 'guilty. 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: Well, we will 
proceed then, Your Honor. If that is going to 
be Your Honor's ruling-
"THE COURT: Yes. 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: - of course, 
we would like -
'''THE COURT: I am going to rule that 
this jury has no interest in whether other 
people have run lights because if we get that 
before us, we have got to go into every case 
to find out whether somebody else was negli-
gent, and that is not - well, it seems to me 
we would be here a month, and I had better 
stop it before we get started. 
"MR. McCULLOUGH: I would like the 
record to show I would like to make a proffer 
of proof, Your Honor. 
"THE COURT: You may do that lat-
er." 
The proffer of proof submitted by the defen-
dant is contained at page R. 91 of the record: 
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"MR. McCULLOUGH: Comes now the 
defendant and offers the following proffer of 
proof: That if the defendant's witness, Mr. 
James W. Challis, city traffic enginee.r,. were 
allowed to testify, he would have te;stif1ed as 
follows: That the intersection at 21st South 
and Ninth East for the year 1959 had the 
second highest number of accidents per num-
ber of cars traveling through the intersection 
of any intersection in Salt Lake City; that 
for a number of years prior thereto and at 
least five that this intersection has been one 
of the ten intersections havin'g the highest 
accident ratio in Salt Lake City; that as a 
result of this accident ratio and studies with 
regard to the intersection itself, the city in-
stalled in place of the single semaphore in 
the center of the street a system of double 
'Semaphores, that is, two semaphores for each 
lane of traffic approaching the intersection 
and that the semaphore that was installed at 
the time of the accident was originally in-
stalled in 1935 and that since 1935 the lenses 
used in these semaphores have been corrected 
and perfected to eliminate the question of 
sun phantom, that is, the inability of the 
drivers to distingui'sh the red, yellow, and 
green signal when the sun is shining directly 
into them; that this semaphore had never 
been changed in 'any way since 1'935 and still 
contained the original lenses; that at the time 
of the installation of the double system of 
semaphores in December of 1959 an all-red 
phase 'signal was installed, that is, that all 
semaphores for traffic approaching in any of 
the four directions are red at the same time 
and maintain a red signal for a definite 
len~gth of time; that these factors were found 
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necessary to correct certain deficiencies exist-
ing at said intersection, said deficiences hav-
ing been determined to exist by reason of the 
prior accident rate and studies carried on in 
the office of the traffic engineer of Salt Lake 
City, Mr. James Challis; further that Mr. 
James Challis would testify with reference to 
the number of accidents which occurred at 
this intersection in the year 1959, the total of 
24 in all, to show their relationship to the 
present or to the case at bar and the similarity 
that existed between them, all of which were 
factors which led the traffic engineer's office 
to recommend and install the new double sys-
tem of semaphores and new all-red phase 
cycle at the intersection of 21st South and 
Ninth East. Judge, you should have let it in. 
"TI-IE COURT : Don't t a k e t h i s, 
Mirm." 
(Discussion off the record) 
The record does not disclose the court's ruling 
with reference to this proffer of proof. However, 
the proffer of proof was refused by the court, and 
Mr. James Challis, city traffic engineer, was not 
allowed to testify to the matters set forth in the 
proffer. 
Defendant Leo Barrett Stewart, Jr. testified 
in his own behalf that on the 9th day of March, 
1959, at approximately 7 :30 A.M. in the morning 
(R. 83) he was proceeding on his way west on 21st 
South to his employment (R. 84). Defendant Stew-
art testified as follows: 
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"Q. Will you tell us what happened. 
"A. I left home at about seven fifteen 
in the morning. I live above the Wasatch 
Boulevard. I drove down to the boulevard and 
on over to Parleys Way to a semaphore light 
there down at 21st South, a semaphore light 
at 21st East and another one down at 17th 
East, another at 13th East, another at 1'1th 
East; proceeded on down the street and came 
to the Ninth Eiast intersection. As I approach-
ed it, the light was green, and the traffic was 
stopped both sides of the road, at least there 
was none - that was stopped on the south. 
The north, I'm not sure whether they were 
at the road or not, but there was no traffic 
moving across the intersection. A car pro-
ceeded ahead of me going west, and I just 
normally proceeded down the street, and just 
as I got into the intersection a car come out 
in front of me, and I hit it broadside. 
"Q. Now, approximately how far back 
from this intersection were you - can you 
people hear him? If you can't raise your hand, 
and we will have him speak a little louder. 
Approximately how far back from the inter-
section were you, Leo, when you first saw 
the light was green or was apparent that it 
was green? 
"A. Oh, it was green as I approached 
from quite a little distance back, possibly a 
half block back up the street. 
"Q. Well, when was the last time you 
saw it? 
"A. The last time I saw it was just be-
fore I got up to the intersection and entered 
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the intersection. There comes a time when 
it is no longer a problem of the light. There 
wasn't time for it to go through a yellow cycle 
and into a red cycle and plenty of time to go 
across the intersection, and I went ahead. 
"Q. Were there any other cars coming 
from the south into the intersection? 
"A. There was one car at the in tersec-
tion, and there was another car approaching 
back behind that. In fact, I think there were 
three cars. I'm not sure, but some of the cars 
for some reason or other drew my attention 
to that side. I don't know whether it was 
movement of a car or what drew my atten-
tion to the side, and I looked to the left and 
swung my eyes back to the right. There was 
a car in front of me. I tried to stop and 
couldn't." 
Mr. Stewart further testified that after the 
impact he went around the other side of the 'Ply-
mouth automobile; that Mr. Weddington was just 
outside of his automobile not more than two feet 
(R. 85) from it (R. 86). That he immediately called 
the service station attendant and then went to a 
telephone booth to call an ambulance. Mr. Stewart 
testified that prior to the entering of the intersec-
tion he was traveling approximately '25 m.p.h.; that 
he had been coming through the various semaphores 
going west on 21st South; that he did not believe 
the semaphores he had come through were in a 
;regular sequence (R. B6). Further, defendant Stew-
art testified ( R. 86) : 
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"Q. As you approached this intersection 
of 21st East and - 21st South and Ninth 
East, will you tell me the position the sun 
was in at that time? 
"A. The sun had just come up. It was 
at my back and had just come up. 
"Q. And you are familiar with Parleys 
Canyon there, are you not? 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Where was the sun in relation to 
Parley's Canyon? 
"A. Well, at that time of the year the 
sun shines down through Parleys Canyon and 
lights down earlier, a little earlier than it 
does other parts of town, through Parleys 
Canyon and Millcreek Canyon the same way. 
The sun comes in quite a lot earlier. 
"Q. Does that shine down 21st South? 
"A. Yes." 
Defendant Stewart further testified that as he 
came into the intersection he did not accelerate his 
vehicle to his knowledge except that possibly when 
he went to stop his foot may have slipped off the 
brake and hit the throttle; that this would have 
occurred only at the point of impact and not prior 
to the point of impact (R. 87). Defendant Stewart 
testified at R. 87 and 88: 
"A. No sir. There was no reason to ac-
celerate. I don't speed up at intersections. 
It is a normal ha:bi t to slow down. 
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"Q. Was there anything to call your 
attention to the fact that you did not have 
the right-of-way through this intersection 
that you could think of? 
"A. Not a thing. It was a complete sur-
prise to me when the car shot up in front of 
me. I proceeded because I thought the inter-
section, the right-of-way was mine. I was 
going on down the street." 
On cross-examination Defendant Stewart testi-
fied ( R. 88) that he had taken this route on two or 
three occasions prior to this; that he was aware of 
the semaphore at the intersection of 9th East and 
21st South and that there was a substantial amount 
of traffic going in all directions. He further testi-
fied that he had a definite recollection of the light 
being green at a distance of approximately 150 feet 
back from the intersection or at the approximate 
location in front of Petty Motor (R. 88): 
"Q. Now, you have mentioned in your 
direct examination the figure of 150 feet back 
from the intersection. I take it that by that 
you are testifying that back here 150 feet, 
say probably somewhere in front of Petty 
Motor, you have a definite recollection of 
seeing the light green at that point. Is that 
right? 
"A. Well, I have no reason to make 
150-foot estimate, but - I think it might be 
wrong, but the light was green as I came up 
to it, yes sir. 
"Q. Well, you did m'ake that estimate 
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right after the accident when the officer 
talked to you, didn't you? 
"A. Yes. I'm not sure whether it was 
suggested or whether I just - came out of 
blue sky or what, because there was no reason 
to make any actual footage. You can't esti-
mate distance that close. I was thinking of 
the position that you are normally in when 
you approach an intersection. There comes a 
time when the light is in the center of the 
street when you can no longer readily see 
them. I don't know whether that is 100 feet, 
1:50 or 70 feet, or some other distance." 
Defendant Stewart testified that he did not 
believe the light turned yellow while it was still 
within his vision (R. 89). Further on cross-exam-
ination Defendant Stewart testified that there were 
two cars on his right, one going around the corner 
making a righthand turn, and the other he assumed 
to be making a righthand turn because it was follow-
ing the other car. That in his opinion the cars on 
his right had not stopped ( R. 90). Defendant Stew-
art testified at R. 90: 
"Q. It is your testimony that you never 
did see a yellow light let alone a red light? 
A. The yellow light didn't come on at 
that time. If it did, I was fooled somehow, 
because to my knowledge the light was green 
up until the time-
"Q. At the time you saw the light was 
green, you had no trouble at that time telling 
it was green, did you? 
"A. No sir." 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
THE CITY ENGINEER, JAMES CHALLIS, TO TESTI-
FY WITH RESPECT TO THE STUDIES AND INVES-
TIGATIONS AT THE PARTICULAR INTERSECTION 
IN QUESTION TO SHOW THE DE'FECTIVE CONDI-
TION OF THE SEMAPHORE. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN THE ADMISSION OF 
EVIDENCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW 
THE CITY ENGINEER, JAMES CHALLIS, TO TESTI-
FY WITH RESPECT TO THE STUDIES AND INVES-
TIGATIONS AT THE PARTICULAR INTERSECTION 
IN QUESTION TO SHOW THE DEFECTIVE CONDI-
TION OF THE SEMAPHORE. 
The proffer of proof with respect to the pro-
posed testimony of the Cit y Engineer, James Challis, 
is set forth in full in the Statement of Fact and is 
therefore not repeated here. It is defendant's con-
tention that the refusal of the lower court to allow 
the city engineer to testify as stated in the proffer 
of proof was prejudicial error and the verdict of 
the jury should be set aside. 
Evidence of the defective condition of the light 
semaphore, i.e., so called "sun phantom", was prof-
ferred by defendant to show that if defendant did 
attempt to pass through a red light on the sema-
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phore there was not present the inattention, or 
reckless disregard for the safety of others necessary 
to complete the crime of negligent homicide. 
In the case of Sinclair v. U. S., 265 F 991, 49 
App DC 351, at page 992, Federal Reports, the 
court states: 
"We do not believe that there was any 
fault on the part of the court in declining to 
permit a witness to testify that he had ob-
served other accidents at the place where this 
occident occurred, and that he had one there 
himself. Those accidents may all have been 
the result of carelessness, and, if so, the fact 
tlla t they took place would have no tendency 
to prove that defendant was not negligent. 
He was, however, permitted through a witness 
to describe the condition of the street at that 
point, and to say that there was 'a right mean 
turn' there. This was proper as bearing upon 
the question as to whether or not that condi-
tion of careless driving of the defendant was 
the cause of the accident." 
Evidence of similar accidents at this intersec-
tion to show a defective condition in operating equip-
mentis admissible. 
Officer Johnson recognized the factor of "sun 
phantom". 
Defendant Stewart testified with respect to the 
position of the sun, i.e., shining directly into the 
semaphore; and that perhaps he was mislead by 
the light. 
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In the case of Parker v. Bamberger, et al, 100 
Utah 361, 116 P 2d 425 (1941), it was alleged that 
the accident was caused by the failure of the rail-
road to keep a wig-wag signal in proper repair so 
that it would give reasonable warning of the pres-
ence of trains upon the tracks in the immediate 
vicinity of the crossing. The court stated at page 
369 of Utah Reports: 
"With respect to the second alleged act 
of negligence the trial court, over objection 
df appellant's counsel, permitted evidence to 
be introduced as to various failures of the 
wig-wag signal to operate on occasions prior 
to the accident. Certainly such evidence was 
immaterial to show a defective signal device, 
as well as to show the probability or the com-
pany having notice of such defect. Appellants 
themselves in traduced evidence to show that 
the device was not defective ·and that it was 
kept in proper repair thus creating a conflict 
in the evidence on this point. But evidence 
of failures of the wig-wag to operate in the 
past was material to show such a defective 
condition of the signal as might explain its 
operation on occasions testified to by appel-
lants' witnesses, and failure to operate on the 
occasions testified to by respondent's wit-
nesses. Under the allegations of the complaint 
and the issues in the case, all such testimony 
with respect to the wig-wag signal tending 
to establish that it was defective and failed 
to operate at the time of the accident and that 
the company knew or should have known of 
such defective condition was properly admis-
sible. Sargent v. Union Fuel Co., 37 Utah 392, 
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108 P 928." See also 46 ALR 2d 936 for simi-
lar cases. 
In the reverse situation it has frequently been 
held that evidence of the absence of previous similar 
accidnts at the same place where a plaintiff is in-
jured in person or property is relevant and compe-
tent as tending to show that the conditions com-
plained of were not so unreasonably dangerous as 
to render a defendant liable for failing to correct 
them. 
The case of Stocker v. Ogden City, McFarland 
v. Ogden City, 88 Utah 389, 54 P 2d 849 (1936) 
was an action against the city for death of a resi-
dent from typhoid fever allegedly caused by drink-
ing impure city water. The owner and manager of 
a hotel, which took water from a creek at a point 
where the water was alleged to be contaminated 
and which was near the city's intake, and the city 
health commissioner were competent to testify to 
the absence of sickness among patrons of the hotel 
who had drunk the allegedly contaminated water. 
The court stated at page 402 of the Utah Reports 
as follows: 
"The chief objection argued is that the 
fact of no sickness at Wheeler Creek 'could not 
be pertinent to any issue in that ca:se,' that 
'defendant might as well have called all the 
other residents of Ogden and shown that they 
did not get typhoid fever by drinking the 
Ogden water,' and therefore argue that the 
disease did not come from the water. 
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"As we have already indicated, the source 
of the disease is a question of fact, and from 
the nature of the case the proof of necessity 
must be wholly circumstantial. Direct and 
positive evidence was not available. It is pro-
per to receive evidence of all circumstances 
which will tend to establish or to disprove the 
source of the disease * * *" See also 31 ALR 
2d 198 for cases in accord. 
See also Shugren v. Salt Lake City, 48 U 320, 
159 P 530 (1916) where it was held that evidence 
that other persons had previously stumbled, though 
had not fallen, over the projection in a sidewalk, 
on which plaintiff had tripped, causing her to fall is 
competent both as notice to the city, and as charac-
terizing the defect. The court states at page 329 
of Utah Reports: 
"Counsel for defendant also insist that 
the court erred in permitting plaintiff's wit-
ness to testify that they saw others persons in 
passing over the projection trip, before the 
plaintiff was tripped and fell. In that connec-
tion counsel contend that if the evidence had 
shown that others had tripped and fallen, then 
the evidence would have been competent, since 
it would then have constituted notice to the 
defendant that the defect was such as might 
cause injury; but they contend, merely to show 
that others in passing over the projection 
stumbled and tripped has no significance for 
the reason that it is a daily occurrence for 
pedestrians to stumble or trip over very slight 
defects. We think the evidence was proper. 
Counsel's argument merely relates to the 
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weight and not to the competency of the evi-
dence. We think the evidence proper both as 
to notice to the defendant and also as charac-
terizing the defect * * *" See also 65 ALR 
383 for other cases in accord. 
See 20 Am Jur- Evidence- par. 304, page 
282 - "Other Accidents and Injuries" : 
"It is recognized in numerous cases that 
for certain purposes at least, evidence of other 
similar accidents or injuries at or near the 
same place or by the use of the same appli-
ance suffered by persons other than the plain-
tiff and at other and different times, not too 
remote in point of time from the particular 
occurrence, is admissible. Evidence of prior 
accidents, when admissible, is generally ad-
missible for the following purposes only: (1) 
To show the existence of a defective or dan-
gerous condition or appliance and the danger-
ous character of the place of injury or of the 
machine or the appliance, and ( 2) to show 
the defendants notice or knowledge thereof." 
See 20 Am Jur -Edidence- par. 247, page 
240, for a definition of relevancy: 
"'Generally, it may be said that any leg-
ally competent evidence which, when taken 
alone or in connection with other evidence, 
affords reasonable inferences upon the mat-
ter in issue, tends to prove or disprove a ma-
terial or controlling issue or to defeat the 
rights asserted by one or the other parties, 
and sheds any light upon or touches the issues 
in such a way as to enable the jury to draw a 
logic~l ~nfere!lce with respect to ~he principal 
fact In Issue Is relevant and admissible." 
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In Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 1, 3rd Ed., par. 
9 I: 
"None but facts having rational proba-
tive value are admissible. This principle is in-
deed axiomatic, for any system of evidence 
purporting to be rational. It assumes no par-
ticular doctrine as to the kind of ratiocination 
implied, - whether practical or scientific, 
coarse and ready, or refined and systematic. 
It prescribes merely that whatever is present-
ed as evidence shall be presented on the hypo-
thesis that it is calculated according to the 
prevailing standards of reasoning, to effect 
rational persuasion." 
See Remy v. Olds, 4 Cal, unreported, 240, 34 
P 216, 21 LRA 645, where one of the grounds urged 
for reversing the judgment was the action of the 
trial court in striking certain testimony as being 
entirely collateral and having "no bearing on the 
case." The reviewing court in discussing the ques-
tion thus raised stated at page 246 of 4 Cal un-
reported at page 218 of 34 Pac.: 
"That the evidence was upon a collateral 
issue is not conclusive whether the fact it 
tended to establish would tend to prove or dis-
prove the fact at issue. Evidence is relevant 
not only when it tends to prove or disprove 
the precise fact in issue, but when it tends 
to establish a fact which the existence or non-
existence of the fact in issue can be directly 
_ inferred." 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN THE ADMISSION OF 
EVIDENCE. 
A. Officer Johnson testified that he found a 
Mr. Taylor, a witness to the accident; that in the 
presence of Officer Johnson and Mr. Taylor and 
Defendant Stewart, Mr. Taylor stated that "Mr. 
Stewart had run the red light;" further Officer 
Johnson testified that Mr. Stewart did not reply 
or say anything to said remark made by Mr. Taylor. 
('R. 39) 
On cross examination ( R. 43) Officer Johnson 
was asked the following question: 
"Q. Did you ever have any other con-
versations with Mr. Stewart when Mr. Taylor 
was present other than the one you just told 
us about? 
"A. Not that I can remember. 
"Q. Do you remember Mr. Stewart, in 
that conversation and in the presence of Mr. 
Taylor, making a statement to this effect: 
'That man ran the red light directly in 
front of me, or something to that ef-
fect?'" 
Objection was made by the state and the court 
refused to allow him to answer. 
Even Mr. Taylor admitted hearing Mr. Stewart 
make such a statement (R. 55). For the court to 
refuse to allow defendant to cross-examine Officer 
Johnson was an unexplained silence on the part of 
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defendant which could only be interpreted by the 
jury as an admission by defendant, when such was 
not the truth. Certainly defendant has the right to 
!mpeach the witness if possible and to lay a founda-
tion for such impeachment. 
B. On cross-examination Officer Johnson was 
asked: 
"Q. One other question, Officer John-
son, * * * this intersection at 9th East and 
21st South is one of the most dangerous in-
tersections in the city, is it not?" 
The court refused to allow Officer Johnson to 
answer that question ( R. 44). 
Argument with respect to this point is ade-
quately set forth in Point I and is therefore not re-
peated here. 
C. On cross-examination of Mr. Hubbard, the 
State's witness, the following question was asked 
(R. 76): 
"Q. Now, also, Mr. Hubbard, isn't it a 
fact that you were particularly cautious of 
this intersection because other cars prior to 
this time had been running the light in front 
of you at the intersection? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Let me call your attention to one 
other factor in your deposition and see if this 
doesn't refresh your recollection to * * *" 
At this point the state objected and the court 
35 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
refused to allow defendant to impeach the witness, 
by the use of a deposition taken in another case, 
wherein he had testified to the contrary. (See prof-
fer of proof (R. 80). That defendant has a right 
to impeach the state's witness by referring to prior 
statements is fundamental. 
Further, Witness Hubbard's testimony in the 
proffer of proof when considered with the excluded 
testimony of the City Engineer, James Challis, is 
explained and clearly admissible. See Point I for 
argument- also 20 Am Jur (Evidence) par. 251, 
page 245. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the lower court should be re-
versed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH 
Attorney for Defendant 
304 East 1st South 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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